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TAKING A STAND:  CLIMATE CHANGE 
LITIGANTS AND THE VIABILITY OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS 
By Mina Juhn* 
 
In response to the accelerating effects of global warming, individuals and 
citizen groups in the United States have brought suit against the federal 
government to challenge the adequacy of existing climate change policies.  
Though statutory and tort claims comprise the bulk of these actions, plaintiffs 
have begun alleging that government inaction on climate change violates 
constitutional and fundamental rights. 
In these matters, the federal judiciary generally applies threshold 
justiciability doctrines, such as standing and the political question doctrine, 
to deny judicial review.  This Note examines the reasoning behind the 
judiciary’s application of these doctrines and evaluates the appropriate 
scope of judicial engagement in climate change litigation, arguing that broad 
invocation of these doctrines undermines the judiciary’s role of protecting 
citizens’ constitutional rights.  It also argues for the recognition of the 
fundamental right to a stable climate implicit in the Constitution.  The recent 
case of Juliana v. United States is as an illustrative example of the 
opportunities and difficulties inherent in climate change lawsuits. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As the impacts of global warming on human and natural systems increase, 
so too do the number of lawsuits brought to mitigate them.1  There is 
widespread scientific consensus that global warming is changing the global 
climate in a manner deleterious to both human and natural systems.2  
Eighteen of the nineteen warmest years on record have occurred since 2001, 
and even the staunchest climate change skeptics recognize the dynamics of 
the carbon cycle.3  In 2018, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) issued a report stating that if greenhouse gas emissions continued at 
their current rate, the resulting temperature increases could destroy coral 
reefs, exacerbate wildfires, jeopardize food supplies, and contribute to 
 
 1. United Nations Env’t Programme, Global Climate Litigation Report:  2020 Status 
Review, U.N. Doc. DEL/2333/NA, at 4 (2020).  According to the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP), there has been a “rapid increase in climate litigation . . . around the 
world.”  In 2017, UNEP identified 884 climate change cases brought in twenty-four countries.  
As of July 1, 2020, this number has nearly doubled to 1550 cases filed in thirty-eight countries.  
Of these, approximately 1200 cases are in the United States. Id. 
 2. See Michael Burger et. al., The Law and Science of Climate Change Attribution, 45 
COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 57, 60 (2020). 
 3. See id.; Hari M. Osofsky, Is Climate Change “International”?:  Litigation’s Diagonal 
Regulatory Role, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 585, 587 (2009). 
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political instability in developing nations.4  Climate change is “one of the key 
challenges of our lifetimes and future generations,”5 and there is significant 
evidence linking extreme weather events and the onset of climate change to 
human activity.6 
The velocity and permanency of global warming have become topics of 
increasing urgency in recent decades7 but have been met in the United States 
by legislative stagnation and agency deregulation.8  Congress’s failure in the 
last thirty years to enact any major legislation to regulate greenhouse gas 
emissions has coincided with a sharp increase in climate lawsuits.9  This 
perceived inaction from the political branches has compelled some plaintiffs 
to turn to the judicial system to combat anthropogenic climate change via a 
growing class of environmental lawsuits known as “climate change 
 
 4. See MYLES ALLEN ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
SUMMARY FOR 8, 23–24 (2018); Benjamin T. Sharp, Comment, Stepping into the Breach:  
State Constitutions as a Vehicle for Advancing Rights-Based Climate Litigation, 14 DUKE J. 
CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 39, 39–40 (2019). 
 5. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Announcing the Clean Power 
Plan (Aug. 3, 2015), http://go.wh.gov/4KvDkq [https://perma.cc/8P9B-XS4R]; see also Eric 
A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, 96 GEO. L.J. 1565, 1611 (2008) 
(noting that climate change implicates economic and social issues, particularly relating to 
“distributive and corrective justice”). 
 6. See Burger et al., supra note 2, at 62–64 (“[H]uman activities—especially fossil fuel 
combustion, land use change, and industrial production—have dramatically impacted earth’s 
climate. As a result of human activities, concentrations of radiatively important agents such 
as [greenhouse gases] and aerosols have increased significantly. Carbon dioxide (CO2) 
concentrations, for example, have increased by more than 40 percent to levels not seen in at 
least 3 million years.”); Osofsky, supra note 3, at 592 (describing anthropogenic climate 
change as the result of decisions made at the “individual, local, state, national, regional, and 
international” levels). 
 7. See Michael C. Blumm & Mary Christina Wood, “No Ordinary Lawsuit”:  Climate 
Change, Due Process, and the Public Trust Doctrine, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 12 (2017) 
(“Scientists warn that the world faces dangerous “tipping points,” which are capable of 
triggering irreversible and uncontrollable heating that would destroy the planet’s climate 
system.”). 
 8. See Nathaniel Levy, Note, Juliana and the Political Generativity of Climate Litigation, 
43 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 479, 479–80 (2019) (noting that the Trump administration’s 
deregulation of environmental protections also contributed to the rise of climate change 
litigation). 
 9. Congress has never passed legislation specifically controlling greenhouse gas 
emissions.  It has passed two statutes to fund federal research on climate change science. See 
National Climate Program Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2901–2908; Global Change Research Act of 
1990, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2921–2961.  During the Obama administration, the EPA promulgated a 
rule in 2015, known as the Clean Power Plan (CPP), which established state guidelines for 
regulating carbon emissions from power plants and sought to reduce power sector emissions 
32 percent below 2005 levels by the year 2030.  In 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court stayed the 
implementation of the CPP and in 2019, the EPA under the Trump administration replaced 
the plan with the Affordable Clean Energy (ACE) rule. See Lisa Friedman, E.P.A. Finalizes 
Its Plan to Replace Obama-Era Climate Rules, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/19/climate/epa-coal-emissions.html [https://perma.cc 
/KG4P-TREG].  The ACE does not set limits on power plant carbon emissions and is expected 
to reduce national carbon emissions by 0.1 percent between 2021 and 2050 via efficiency 
improvements. See id.  See generally Lisa Heinzerling, The Supreme Court’s Clean-Power 
Power Grab, 28 GEO. ENV’T L. REV. 425 (2016). 
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litigation.”10  These litigants do not purport to supplant the political process, 
and there remains a general consensus that the political branches should 
address climate change via legislative or executive action.11  Yet, in the 
absence of a large-scale or effective response to the growing climate crisis, 
plaintiffs have attempted to compel regulatory and political action through 
the courts.12 
Climate change litigation encompasses many types of lawsuits that seek to 
hold certain actors accountable for their contributions to or failures to act on 
climate change.13  Plaintiffs may bring litigation against federal and state 
governments, city administrations, and corporations; the most common 
claimants are environmental organizations, industry trade groups, local 
governments, and citizen groups.14 
In the United States, climate change litigation has traditionally involved 
statutory claims or claims sounding in common-law tort doctrines.15  In 
contrast to administrative or common-law claims, rights-based climate 
change lawsuits against governments and public authorities have recently 
gained traction.16  These public law actions seek to compel federal, state, and 
local governments to escalate their efforts to address climate change by 
raising human rights and constitutional arguments.17 
 
 10. See Hari M. Osofsky, The Geography of Climate Change Litigation:  Narratives of 
Massachusetts v. EPA (pt. 2), 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 573, 574 (2008) (noting that “[c]limate change 
litigation is one of many civil society and governmental initiatives that have emerged in 
response to the lack of effective international environmental regulation”); Hari M. Osofsky, 
Litigation’s Role in the Path of U.S. Federal Climate Change Regulation:  Implications of 
AEP v. Connecticut, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 447, 455 (2012) (arguing in favor of climate change 
lawsuits as “litigation provides a way for key stakeholders to address conflicts over how to 
move forward”).  See generally United Nations Env’t Programme, supra note 1. 
 11. See Burger et al., supra note 2, at 228. 
 12. See, e.g., Jeff Todd, A Fighting Stance in Environmental Justice Litigation, 50 ENV’T 
L. 557, 570–73 (2020); Anna Christiansen, Note, Up in the Air:  A Fifty-State Survey of 
Atmospheric Trust Litigation Brought by Our Children’s Trust, 2020 UTAH L. REV. 867, 868–
73; Myanna Dellinger, See You in Court:  Around the World in Eight Climate Change 
Lawsuits, 42 WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV. 525, 525–28 (2018). 
 13. See Burger et al., supra note 2, at 62. 
 14. See Katrina Fischer Kuh, The Legitimacy of Judicial Climate Engagement, 46 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 731, 734 (2019). 
 15. See infra Part I.A. 
 16. See, e.g., Megan Raymond, A Hypothetical Win for Juliana Plaintiffs:  Ensuring 
Victory Is More than Symbolic, 46 ECOLOGY L.Q. 705, 705–07 (2019).  Outside of the United 
States, plaintiffs have also brought climate lawsuits alleging constitutional and human rights 
claims.  For example, judges in the Netherlands and Pakistan have delivered significant 
victories to climate change activists who argued, in part, on constitutional grounds.  In the 
Netherlands, the Hague Court of Appeal held that the government’s emissions program was 
insufficient and thus violated the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights and the government’s treaty 
responsibilities. See MARIA BANDA, ENV’T L. INST., CLIMATE SCIENCE IN THE COURTS:  A 
REVIEW OF U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS 79 (2020); infra note 382–
85.  In Pakistan, the Lahore High Court held that the national government’s delay in 
implementing its climate change policy violated citizens’ fundamental rights. See id. at 96–97 
(2020). 
 17. See Blumm & Wood, supra note 7, at 6–7. 
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To date, the most prominent climate change lawsuit18 of this type—
noteworthy both for the scope of its constitutional claims and the youth of its 
plaintiffs—is Juliana v. United States.19  The twenty-one young plaintiffs 
allege that, despite the federal government’s obligation to reduce carbon 
emissions, the government has actively facilitated the country’s increased 
carbon emissions by supporting the fossil fuel industry.20  The Juliana 
plaintiffs argue that the government’s actions have violated their 
“fundamental constitutional rights to life, liberty, and property.”21 
In 2016, the case generated extensive media coverage when Judge Ann 
Aiken of the District Court of Oregon declared that “the right to a climate 
system capable of sustaining human life is fundamental to a free and ordered 
society.”22  In January 2020, a panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower 
court’s decision for lack of standing.23  Although the Ninth Circuit 
acknowledged that federal policies contributed to sustaining high levels of 
carbon emissions, the court decided that carbon emissions policies presented 
political questions that required resolution by the political branches.24  As a 
result, the panel held that the plaintiffs did not satisfy the requirements for 
Article III standing and reversed the lower court’s decision.25 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision is emblematic of the judiciary’s typical 
response to climate change litigation, particularly to the cases in which 
plaintiffs advance constitutional or rights-based claims.26  Often, the 
judiciary finds that policymaking discretion, class certification, or separation 
of powers concerns restrict their ability to grant relief and routinely dismisses 
suits for lack of standing.27 
This Note examines federal climate change lawsuits in the United States 
alleging constitutional violations.  Part I begins with a brief overview of 
statutory and common-law claims in climate change litigation and proceeds 
to a discussion of the legal rights and issues implicated by constitutional 
claims.  Part I also introduces Juliana as a case study for evaluating the legal 
strategies and justiciability issues involved in rights-based arguments.  Part 
II reviews the arguments for and against pursuing constitutional claims in 
climate change litigation, focusing on the procedural and substantive issues 
 
 18. Juliana v. United States (Juliana II), 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020), reh’g denied, 986 
F.3d 1295 (9th Cir. 2021) (mem.). 
 19. 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020); id. at 1166. 
 20. See Juliana v. United States (Juliana I), 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1233 (D. Or. 2016), 
rev’d and remanded, 947 F.3d 1159. 
 21. Id. at 1264. 
 22. Id. at 1250. 
 23. See Juliana II, 947 F.3d at 1175. 
 24. See id. (“We reluctantly conclude, however, that the plaintiffs’ case must be made to 
the political branches or to the electorate at large, the latter of which can change 
the composition of the political branches through the ballot box.”). 
 25. Id.  After the plaintiffs’ petition for rehearing en banc was denied, they indicated that 
they would seek a writ of certiorari. See infra notes 212–14 and accompanying text. 
 26. See infra Part I.B. 
 27. See, e.g., Animal Legal Def. Fund v. United States, 404 F. Supp. 3d 1294 (D. Or. 
2019); Clean Air Council v. United States, 362 F. Supp. 3d 237 (E.D. Pa. 2019); see also Kuh, 
supra note 14, at 734. 
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raised.  Part III argues that constitutional claims in climate change litigation 
should be granted standing and that they merit judicial review. 
I.  OVERVIEW OF CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION 
Climate change litigation is unified in its focus on the harmful impacts of 
climate change, but plaintiffs have utilized an array of approaches, which has 
resulted in a range of litigation strategies.28  Climate change litigation 
extends beyond the traditional confines of environmental litigation—which 
focuses largely on air and water pollution, the preservation of endangered 
species, and environmental impact statements29—to cases that argue for a 
constitutional right to a stable climate and the rights of future generations.30 
This part establishes several necessary legal foundations.  Part I.A reviews 
federal statutory and common-law causes of action.  Part I.B discusses the 
sources of rights for constitutional claims and the justiciability issues 
involved.  Part I.C introduces Juliana—this Note’s central case study of a 
constitutional climate change lawsuit—and reviews its procedural posture 
and legal arguments. 
A.  Traditional Sources of Legal Rights 
The legal bases for climate change lawsuits include statutory, common-
law, and constitutional causes of action.31  Statutory claims are the most 
common, followed by claims sounding in common-law tort doctrines, in 
particular public nuisance, private nuisance, and negligence.32  
Constitutional claims comprise a comparably smaller but growing subset of 
climate change litigation.33  This Note focuses primarily on the strength and 
generativity of constitutional claims34 brought by environmentalist plaintiffs 
but begins with an instructive overview of the other categories of climate 
litigation. 
1.  Statutory Authority 
A significant number of climate change lawsuits allege violations of 
federal statutes and regulations, including the Administrative Procedure 
 
 28. See Levy, supra note 8, at 498–500. 
 29. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
 30. See generally Maria L. Banda & Scott Fulton, Litigating Climate Change in National 
Courts:  Recent Trends and Developments in Global Climate Law, 47 Env’t L. Rep. News & 
Analysis 10,121 (Env’t L. Inst. Feb. 2017). 
 31. See Levy, supra note 8, at 499. 
 32. See id. 
 33. See Lisa Heinzerling, A Meditation on Juliana v. United States (May 28, 2019) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3395471 [https://perma.cc/G27N-
GGSU]; see also John Schwartz, Students, Cities and States Take the Climate Fight to Court, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/10/climate/climate-change-
lawsuits-courts.html [https://perma.cc/8P72-2F79]. 
 34. See Levy, supra note 8, at 482. 
2021] TAKING A STAND 2737 
Act,35 the National Environmental Policy Act,36 the Clean Air Act of 196337 
(CAA), the Clean Water Act of 1977,38 and the Endangered Species Act of 
197339  Actions against private entities have also arisen under securities 
regulations or as requests under the Freedom of Information Act.40  
According to an analysis of the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law’s 
climate change litigation database, which tracks lawsuits brought by 
environmental and citizen groups between 1990 and 2016, 65 percent of 
cases had a federal statutory cause of action.41 
The most noteworthy climate lawsuits alleging statutory violations and 
challenging government efforts to regulate carbon emissions have been 
brought under the CAA.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s seminal decision in 
Massachusetts v. EPA42 in 2007 arguably instigated the current proliferation 
of climate change lawsuits and is the preeminent example of an 
environmental lawsuit seeking to compel government action under a 
statutory scheme.43  In Massachusetts, several U.S. states, cities, and 
environmental groups challenged the Environmental Protection Agency’s 
(EPA) denial of a rulemaking petition to regulate greenhouse gas emissions 
from motor vehicles.44  The plaintiffs alleged that the government’s inaction 
would result in specific climate change–induced harms—including serious 
adverse effects on human health—and sought to compel the government to 
regulate carbon dioxide emissions pursuant to the CAA.45  In response, the 
EPA argued that greenhouse gas emissions did not qualify as air pollutants 
and that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated a sufficient and particularized 
harm required to establish standing.46  The EPA further argued that even if it 
had authority to regulate greenhouse gases, it would be unwise to do so at 
that time.47 
 
 35. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706. 
 36. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370; see, e.g., Indigenous Env’t Network v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 
347 F. Supp. 3d 561, 572 (D. Mont.), order amended and supplemented, 369 F. Supp. 3d 1045 
(D. Mont. 2018), appeal dismissed, No. 18-36068, 2019 WL 2542756 (9th Cir. June 6, 2019); 
Hapner v. Tidwell, 621 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2010); Wildearth Guardians v. U.S. Forest Serv., 
668 F. Supp. 2d 1314 (D.N.M. 2009). 
 37. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671; see, e.g., Sierra Club v. EPA, 699 F.3d 530, 531 (D.C. Cir. 
2012); New York v. EPA, 443 F.3d 880, 883 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 38. Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 33 
U.S.C.). 
 39. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 and 
16 U.S.C.); see, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Zinke, 900 F.3d 1053, 1058 (9th Cir. 
2018); Colorado v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 362 F. Supp. 3d 951, 959–60 (D. Colo. 2018). 
 40. 5 U.S.C. § 552; see also BANDA, supra note 16, at 53. 
 41. See Sabin Ctr. for Climate Change L. & Arnold & Porter, U.S. Climate Change 
Litigation, CLIMATE CHANGE LITIG. DATABASES, http://climatecasechart.com/us-climate-
change-litigation [https://perma.cc/URJ4-E3SY] (last visited Apr. 14, 2021); see also Burger 
et al., supra note 2, at 171. 
 42. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 43. See id.; BANDA, supra note 16, at 14. 
 44. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 497 (2007). 
 45. See id. at 510. 
 46. Id. at 511. See also infra notes 140–42 and accompanying text. 
 47. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 511. 
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The Court found that greenhouse gas emissions qualified as air pollutants 
and consequently were subject to regulation by the EPA.48  The Court further 
held that the EPA’s refusal to regulate emissions constituted an actual and 
imminent harm and that the EPA was authorized and obligated under the 
CAA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions if the EPA determined that such 
emissions endanger public health and welfare.49 
Writing in dissent, Chief Justice Roberts maintained that the claims 
constituted a nonjusticiable question and disputed the majority’s finding that 
the plaintiffs had demonstrated sufficient causation and redressability.50  
Chief Justice Roberts also questioned whether the redress sought would 
alleviate a global problem like climate change, noting that approximately 80 
percent of global emissions originate outside the United States.51  Justice 
Antonin Scalia, in a separate dissent, criticized the majority for depriving the 
EPA of Chevron deference in favor of its own policy determinations.52 
In addition to causes of action brought under environmental statutes, 
plaintiffs have also brought claims under federal securities laws.53  These 
cases often allege that directors of oil and gas corporations violated their 
fiduciary duties to shareholders by misleading them as to the impact of the 
companies’ carbon output on global warming.54  For example, in Ramirez v. 
Exxon Mobil Corp.,55 a group of shareholders brought a class action suit 
under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,56 alleging that 
Exxon Mobil had defrauded investors by purposefully misrepresenting 
climate risks.57  In 2018, a Texas federal district court found that the 
shareholders had adequately pleaded the alleged misstatements and met the 
standard for a securities fraud claim.58  Current and former employees of 
Exxon Mobil advanced similar arguments in Fentress v. Exxon Mobil 
Corp.,59 in which the employees sued the company for violations of the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 197460 (ERISA).  The 
plaintiffs alleged that Exxon Mobil’s failure to disclose and consider the 
impact of environmental risks and its materially false statements about the 
health of the company constituted a breach of its fiduciary duties.61  While 
 
 48. See id. at 528. 
 49. See id. at 532. 
 50. Id. at 536 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 51. Id. at 545. 
 52. Id. at 560 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“No matter how important the underlying policy 
issues at stake, this Court has no business substituting its own desired outcome for the 
reasoned judgment of the responsible agency.”). 
 53. See BANDA, supra note 16, at 50. 
 54. Id. 
 55. 334 F. Supp. 3d 832 (N.D. Tex. 2018). 
 56. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 
U.S.C.). 
 57. BANDA, supra note 16, at 51–52. 
 58. See id. at 52; see also Ramirez, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 859. 
 59. 304 F. Supp. 3d 569 (S.D. Tex. 2018). 
 60. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the 
U.S.C.). 
 61. See Fentress, 304 F. Supp. 3d at 572. 
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the court did not question the elements of climate change argued by the 
plaintiffs, citing Massachusetts, it found that the plaintiffs failed to meet the 
pleading standard for ERISA claims and dismissed the case.62  Plaintiffs in 
climate change litigation have had inconsistent degrees of procedural success 
when bringing claims under other federal statutes. 
2.  Common-Law Tort Doctrines 
Plaintiffs in climate change litigation have also sought relief through tort 
claims by suing major carbon emitters.63  These suits are based on common-
law tort theories such as public nuisance, private nuisance, and negligence 
and are reminiscent of the mass tort strategies employed in tobacco and 
asbestos litigation.64 
Proving causation is a universal difficulty facing plaintiffs who bring tort 
claims to address harms wrought by climate change.65  Despite differences 
in the legal elements of public nuisance, private nuisance, and negligence, 
the duty and breach elements are explicitly central to negligence claims and 
are imported into nuisance claims via the concept of “unreasonable 
interference.”66  Climate change litigation grounded in tort law struggles with 
the attenuation between the alleged causes and harmful effects of a 
defendant’s conduct because the harm may be delayed or not sufficiently 
particularized.67  While courts have largely accepted that anthropogenic 
carbon emissions cause global warming, demonstrating that a defendant’s 
actions were the factual and proximate cause of the plaintiffs’ harms is 
considerably more difficult.68 
In Native Village of Kivalina v. Exxon Mobil,69 the Native Village of 
Kivalina, the governing body of an Iñupiat village in Alaska, and the City of 
Kivalina sued approximately two dozen fossil fuel companies for their 
contributions to climate change and the corresponding damage to the village, 
alleging a public nuisance under federal common law.70  The District Court 
for the Northern District of California dismissed the case for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction and standing, finding that the plaintiffs did not 
demonstrate that their injuries were “traceable” to the defendants’ actions, 
despite detailing how the defendants’ alleged practice of emitting 1.2 billion 
tons of greenhouse gases annually would lead to localized impacts on the 
village involving melting permafrost and rising sea levels.71 
 
 62. See id. at 586; see also BANDA, supra note 16, at 50. 
 63. See Burger et al., supra note 2, at 191. 
 64. See id.; see also BANDA, supra note 16, at 18. 
 65. See BANDA, supra note 16, at 18. 
 66. See Burger et al., supra note 2, at 195. 
 67. See Douglas A. Kysar, What Climate Change Can Do About Tort Law, 41 ENV’T L. 
1, 30 (2011). 
 68. See id. at 29; see also Burger et al., supra note 2, at 205. 
 69. 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d on other grounds, 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 
2012). 
 70. See Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 865. 
 71. Id. at 878. 
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Similarly, in Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc.,72 residents of Mississippi 
filed a class action against energy, fossil fuel, and chemical companies based 
on state common-law claims of public and private nuisance, trespass, 
negligence, unjust enrichment, fraudulent misrepresentation, and civil 
conspiracy.73  The plaintiffs alleged that the companies’ carbon emissions 
output contributed to global warming and would exacerbate the effects of 
Hurricane Katrina on the Gulf Coast.74  Though the District Court for the 
Southern District of Mississippi dismissed the case for lack of standing, the 
Fifth Circuit reversed and held that the plaintiffs had Article III standing to 
bring their nuisance, trespass, and negligence claims in federal court.75 
Scholars express general hesitance about the efficacy of tort doctrines in 
climate change litigation, noting that the elements of tort law are insufficient 
to address climate change harms.76  Professor Douglas Kysar explains that 
climate change claims are so “diffuse and disparate in origin, lagged and 
latticed in effect, [that] anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions represent 
the paradigmatic anti-tort, a collective action problem so pervasive and so 
complicated as to render at once both all of us and none of us responsible.”77 
Tort law’s inability to address climate change harms was amplified by the 
Supreme Court’s holding in American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut78 
(American Electric II), which reinforced the strategy of employing statutory 
claims in proregulatory environmental litigation.79  Eight states and New 
York City sued five private utilities, alleging that the companies’ carbon 
emissions outputs contributed to global warming and amounted to nuisance 
under state and federal common law.80  The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief 
compelling the utility companies to reduce their emissions levels.81  The 
Court unanimously held that “the Clean Air Act and the EPA actions it 
authorizes displace any federal common-law right to seek abatement of 
carbon-dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel fired power plants.”82  The 
 
 72. 839 F. Supp. 2d 849 (S.D. Miss. 2012), aff’d, 718 F.3d 460 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 73. Id. at 852–53. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See Patrick A. Woods, Reversal by Recusal?:  Comer v. Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc. and 
the Need for Mandatory Judicial Recusal Statements, 13 U.N.H. L. REV. 177, 180–83 (2015).  
The Fifth Circuit granted rehearing en banc shortly after issuing the decision, and subsequently 
lost its quorum to decide the case before hearing it.  The court ultimately held that it must 
dismiss the appeal due to lack of quorum and thus, the vacatur of the original panel decision 
remained in place.  When the plaintiffs refiled the tort action in 2011, the district court 
dismissed on res judicata grounds.  The Fifth Circuit affirmed. See James S. Malloy & John 
M. Sylvester, Insurance Coverage for Global Warming Liability Claims, 45 TORT TRIAL & 
INS. PRAC. L.J. 811, 813–14 (2010). 
 76. Compare Kysar, supra note 67, and Victor E. Schwartz et. al., Why Trial Courts Have 
Been Quick to Cool “Global Warming” Suits, 77 TENN. L. REV. 803, 805 (2010), with Maxine 
Burkett, Climate Justice and the Elusive Climate Tort, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 115, 115–16 
(2011). 
 77. See Kysar, supra note 67, at 4. 
 78. 564 U.S. 410 (2011). 
 79. See Osofsky, supra note 10, at 448. 
 80. See American Electric II, 564 U.S. at 418. 
 81. See id. at 419. 
 82. Id. at 424. 
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plurality in American Electric II upheld the Massachusetts Court’s rationale 
for finding standing and based its decision on Massachusetts’s holding that 
greenhouse gas emissions qualify as air pollutants.83  The Court determined 
that Congress had delegated the responsibility to determine how to regulate 
carbon emissions from power plants to the EPA and that such “delegation . . . 
displaces federal common law.”84 
Further, the Court found that the CAA would displace federal tort claims 
even if the EPA chose not to regulate greenhouse gas emissions.85  Thus, 
American Electric II signaled the Court’s preference for a regulatory-focused 
course for climate litigation.86  In precluding the use of federal common-law 
nuisance actions to challenge EPA regulations, the Court identified 
regulatory suits as the appropriate vehicle for such actions.87  It also deprived 
plaintiffs of another avenue for seeking redress for environmental injuries.88  
As a result, recent nuisance claims against energy companies have sounded 
in state common law, avoiding federal common-law tort doctrines altogether 
because it is unclear if the American Electric II decision displaces state 
common-law claims.89 
The development of climate change torts thus remains largely stymied by 
the fundamentally binary conventions of tort law.  As Professor Kysar notes, 
the nature of climate harms is difficult to square with the duty, breach, 
causation, and injury prongs of the traditional tort analysis.90  As a result, 
courts addressing climate change harms often deem those harms to be 
“nontortious activities that nevertheless threaten core interests tort law claims 
to protect.”91  Though Kysar observes that climate change lawsuits—“the 
mother of all collective action problems”—may challenge the judiciary’s 
view of tort claims as fundamentally distinct from regulatory claims, he also 
notes that this would require the courts to “stretch in plaintiffs’ direction at 
nearly every stage of the traditional tort analysis.”92 
B.  Constitutional and Rights-Based Claims 
Cases alleging constitutional rights violations diverge from the statutory 
or common-law claims traditionally brought by environmental litigants.93  
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 84. American Electric II, 564 U.S. at 426. 
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 86. See Osofsky, supra note 83, at 102. 
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These cases generally assert that government failures to adequately regulate 
the fossil fuel industry or reduce carbon emissions violate plaintiffs’ 
fundamental or constitutional rights.94 
1.  Sources of Rights 
The U.S. Constitution, unlike some state constitutions95 or constitutions of 
foreign jurisdictions,96 does not recognize the right to a stable environment, 
and courts have generally found that there is no constitutional environmental 
right.97  Nevertheless, two legal sources are available to plaintiffs bringing 
fundamental rights claims to challenge government inaction.98  First, the Due 
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments may protect rights 
that are unenumerated yet considered fundamental under the theory of 
substantive due process.99  Second, the public trust doctrine asserts that the 
government must act as a trustee of public natural resources and preserve 
such resources for future generations.100 
a.  Substantive Due Process 
The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
guarantee the right to life, liberty, and property.101  Substantive due process 
stipulates that the government must protect fundamental rights or liberties 
 
 94. See Burger et al., supra note 2, at 176. 
 95. State courts provide an alternative forum for climate litigants advancing rights-based 
claims.  Unlike the U.S. Constitution, more than half of state constitutions include 
environmental provisions, and several recognize a fundamental right to a healthy environment. 
See, e.g., MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3, art. IX, § 1 (stating that the “right to a clean and healthful 
environment” is the first inalienable right for Montanans and that “[t]he state and each person 
shall maintain and improve a clean and healthful environment”); PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 
(guaranteeing the citizens of Pennsylvania “a right to clean air, pure water, and to the 
preservation of the natural, scenic, historic, and esthetic values of the environment”); see also 
James R. May & William Romanowicz, Environmental Rights in State Constitutions, in 
PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 305, 306 (James R. May ed., 2011). 
 96. See, e.g., KONGERIKET NORGES GRUNNLOV [CONSTITUTION] May 17, 1814, art. 112 
(Nor.) (“Every person has the right to an environment that is conducive to health and to a 
natural environment whose productivity and diversity are maintained.”); CONSTITUIÇÃO 
FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 225 (Braz.) (“Everyone has the right to an ecologically 
balanced environment, which is a public good for the people’s use and essential for a healthy 
life . . . .”); CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [CONSTITUTION], B.O.E. n.45.2, Oct. 31, 1978 (Spain) 
(“Everyone has the right to enjoy an environment suitable for the development of the person, 
as well as the duty to preserve it.”).  See generally DAVID R. BOYD, THE ENVIRONMENTAL 
RIGHTS REVOLUTION:  A GLOBAL STUDY OF CONSTITUTIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT (2012). 
 97. See Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1139 (4th Cir. 1971) (“While a growing number of 
commentators argue in support of a constitutional protection for the environment, this newly-
advanced constitutional doctrine has not yet been accorded judicial sanction.”); BANDA, supra 
note 16, at 58. 
 98. See Burger et al., supra note 2, at 176. 
 99. See id. 
 100. See id. 
 101. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. 
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that are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition”102 and “implicit 
in the concept of ordered liberty.”103  After an early application of substantive 
due process in Lochner v. New York,104 the doctrine was revitalized in the 
mid–twentieth century and initiated a “new paradigm of substantive due 
process decisionmaking”105 that forbade the government from infringing on 
“‘fundamental’ liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, 
unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state 
interest.”106 
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Griswold v. Connecticut,107 in 
which it struck down state bans on contraception in violation of the right to 
marital privacy inherent in the “penumbras”108 of rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution, the Court expanded substantive due process jurisprudence.  In 
the following decades, the right to privacy expanded to include the right of 
interracial couples to marry,109 the right to an abortion,110 and the right to 
engage in intimate sexual conduct.111  In Obergefell v. Hodges,112 in which 
the Court recognized the right of same-sex couples to marry, Justice Anthony 
Kennedy asserted that “[t]he identification and protection of fundamental 
rights is an enduring part of the judicial duty to interpret the Constitution.”113 
Recognizing these fundamental rights is not a formulaic judicial 
process.114  Instead, courts must “exercise reasoned judgment” in identifying 
rights so fundamental as to require the government’s respect.115  Though 
history and tradition are the starting point for a substantive due process 
analysis, they “do not set its outer boundaries.”116 
Still, climate change litigants advancing due process claims have achieved 
limited success with these arguments.  In Clean Air Council v. United 
States,117 an environmental organization and two plaintiffs sued the federal 
government asserting violations of due process and the public trust 
doctrine.118  The plaintiffs alleged that the Trump administration’s rollbacks 
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of environmental regulations violated the plaintiffs’ rights to life, liberty, and 
property under the Fifth Amendment.119  The district court held that the 
plaintiffs lacked standing because their particularized injuries were not 
imminent or traceable to the administration’s regulatory scheme.120  The 
court also declined to find a substantive due process right to a life-sustaining 
climate, noting that due process is “a limitation on the State’s power to act, 
not . . . a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security.”121 
Similarly, in Animal Legal Defense Fund v. United States,122 two nonprofit 
organizations and six individuals sued the federal government, alleging that 
federal policies contributed to increased greenhouse gas emissions and 
violated their due process rights.123  The plaintiffs sought declaratory and 
injunctive relief ordering the government to adopt plans to reduce fossil fuel 
extraction.124  The district court dismissed the case, finding that the plaintiffs 
had not established the particularized harm required for standing and that the 
issue was nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine.125 
b.  The Public Trust Doctrine 
The public trust doctrine, another source of legal rights for environmental 
plaintiffs, is a foundational legal principle derived from ancient Roman 
law.126  The doctrine contends that a sovereign’s natural resources constitute 
an ecological trust or endowment and that the government is its trustee, 
responsible for maintaining and protecting these resources for the public 
welfare.127  Some scholars argue that constitutional underpinnings justify the 
public trust doctrine, characterizing the public trust as based on the inherent 
and inalienable rights of the citizenry that the Constitution preserves through 
its social contract.128 
American courts recognize that states have certain obligations under the 
public trust doctrine.129  Recently, environmentalist plaintiffs and 
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commentators have argued that the states’ responsibility to hold natural 
resources in trust, as well as the federal government’s holding of public trust 
resources via its control over territories, the seas, and waters, justifies the 
extension of the public trust doctrine to the atmosphere.130  This movement 
seeks to establish the recognition of an “atmospheric trust doctrine” that 
would impose a legal and fiduciary duty on governments to protect the 
atmosphere and implement policies to reduce carbon dioxide emissions.131  
Proponents of the atmospheric trust doctrine contend that the atmosphere is 
“a single public trust asset in its entirety” and seek a judicial remedy to 
compel governments to implement emissions policies that would ensure the 
preservation of this natural resource.132 
Thus far, lawsuits brought under the public trust doctrine are often 
dismissed on procedural grounds.133  For example, in Clean Air Council, the 
plaintiffs alleged that the Trump administration’s regulatory rollbacks 
violated the public trust doctrine and constitutional due process.134  The 
district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ public trust argument for lack of 
standing and, in the alternative, for failure to state a claim.135  Similarly, in 
Sanders-Reed ex rel. Sanders-Reed v. Martinez,136 an environmental 
nonprofit and a minor plaintiff sued the state of New Mexico, seeking a 
judgment declaring that the public trust doctrine imposes a duty on the state 
to regulate greenhouse gas emissions.137  The court granted summary 
judgment for the state and held that, despite the state’s duty to protect the 
atmosphere under the New Mexico Constitution,138 the case required a 
political, rather than a judicial, resolution.139 
In other instances, courts have disputed the extension of a state’s 
obligations under the public trust doctrine to the federal government.  In Alec 
 
‘sovereign lands.’”).  Note that the Court’s use of “sovereign lands” in Coeur d’Alene Tribe 
of Idaho refers to state, not tribal, sovereignty.  Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 
387, 453 (1892) (“The state can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole 
people are interested, like navigable waters and soils under them . . . than it can abdicate its 
police powers in the administration of government and the preservation of the peace.”). 
 130. See Kelly, supra note 126, at 218. 
 131. Abate, supra note 128, at 552. 
 132. Mary Christina Wood, The Planet on the Docket:  Atmospheric Trust Litigation to 
Protect Earth’s Climate System and Habitability, 9 FLA. A & M U. L. REV. 259, 270 (2014). 
 133. See Kuh, supra note 14, at 740. 
 134. Clean Air Council v. United States, 362 F. Supp. 3d 237, 242 (E.D. Pa. 2019). 
 135. Id. at 254.  In particular, the court found that the organizational plaintiff, Clean Air 
Council, lacked standing as an organization and that the individual plaintiffs failed to meet the 
injury, causation, and redressability requirements for standing. Id. at 245–50.  The court also 
held that there was “no legally cognizable due process right to environmental quality” and that 
plaintiffs’ claims were unsupported by both the Ninth Amendment and the public trust 
doctrine. Id. at 250. 
 136. 350 P.3d 1221 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015). 
 137. See id. at 1222. 
 138. N.M. CONST. art. XX, § 21. 
 139. See Sanders-Reed, 350 P.3d at 1227 (“[T]he courts cannot independently regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere as Plaintiffs have proposed, based solely upon a 
common law duty established under the public trust doctrine as a separate cause of action.”); 
Kuh, supra note 14, at 740. 
2746 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
L. v. Jackson,140 minor plaintiffs sued the federal government for violating 
the public trust doctrine and sought to compel stronger action to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions.141  The district court dismissed the suit, rejecting 
the existence of a federal public trust doctrine and holding that even if the 
doctrine existed, it was displaced under the CAA.142  The court wrote that 
granting the plaintiffs’ request for declaratory and injunctive relief would 
amount to the judicial branch making, implementing, and monitoring policy 
to regulate carbon dioxide emissions, a decision that the court held was better 
left to the political branches.143  Thus, atmospheric trust litigation has often 
been stymied by justiciability doctrines and the general judicial consensus 
that the public trust doctrine only imposes state obligations. 
2.  Justiciability Doctrines 
Overall, courts have demonstrated a general reticence about proceeding to 
review on the merits of cases relating to questions of climate change policy.  
The judiciary frequently applies justiciability doctrines to statutory, 
common-law, constitutional, and rights-based claims alike, deferring these 
issues to the political branches.144  The doctrines most often cited in climate 
litigation are standing and the political question doctrine, both of which are 
founded in separation of powers concerns.145 
a.  Standing 
Since the 1940s, the Supreme Court has interpreted the “cases and 
controversies”146 criterion of Article III jurisdiction to require that plaintiffs 
possess standing to file suit in federal court.147  The conventional three-part 
test from Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife148 for evaluating whether there is 
standing—“a genuine interest and stake in [the] case”149—requires that:  (1) 
the plaintiff has suffered an injury in fact that is concrete and particularized, 
(2) there is a causal connection between the injury and alleged conduct, and 
(3) there is a likelihood that the injury could be redressed by a favorable 
 
 140. 863 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D.D.C. 2012), aff’d sub nom. Alec L. ex rel. Loorz v. McCarthy, 
561 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 141. See id. at 12. 
 142. Id. at 17; see also Kuh, supra note 14, at 741. 
 143. See Alec L., 863 F. Supp. 2d at 17.  However, the court noted that even though it was 
denying plaintiffs relief, it “urge[d] everyone involved to seek (and perhaps even to seize) as 
much common ground” as possible to address policies aimed at preserving the environment, 
which it characterized as “a laudable goal.” Id. 
 144. See Kuh, supra note 14, at 732. 
 145. See Todd, supra note 12, at 574. 
 146. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 147. Bradford C. Mank, Standing for Private Parties in Global Warming Cases:  Traceable 
Standing Causation Does Not Require Proximate Causation, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 869, 
875. 
 148. 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
 149. See Mank, supra note 147, at 875; see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
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decision.150  If a plaintiff fails to meet these requirements, a federal court 
must dismiss the case before reaching the merits.151 
The nature of climate change harms complicates the first requirement that 
a plaintiff must specify a concrete, particularized injury.152  Global warming, 
by definition, impacts individuals on a global scale and imposes a 
“generalized grievance” on all members of the public.153  The diffuse, 
indiscriminate, and delayed impact of climate change is in conflict with the 
standing doctrine’s understanding of imminent or particularized harms, as 
noted by Professor Kysar in his discussion of climate torts.154  Though courts 
readily accept scientific evidence demonstrating the ongoing nature of 
climate change, the question remains whether climate harms are concrete 
enough for judicial resolution.155 
Federal district courts have dismissed climate change lawsuits on the basis 
of plaintiffs’ failure to satisfy the three prongs of the Lujan test.156  In 
Kivalina, the district court held that the plaintiffs could not prove causation 
because the alleged harms were not traceable to the defendants’ carbon 
emissions practices.157  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the ruling, although it did 
not specifically address standing.158  In Comer, the district court similarly 
held that the plaintiffs did not have standing because their injuries were not 
traceable to the defendant.159 
However, the Supreme Court’s decisions in Massachusetts and American 
Electric II are notable for their approach to standing.  In Massachusetts, the 
Court held for the first time that, in some circumstances, states have a greater 
standing right than other litigants because of their quasi-sovereign interests 
in the health, welfare, and natural resources of their citizens and were thus 
entitled to “special solicitude” by the Court.160  The Massachusetts plaintiffs 
argued that the EPA’s failure to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from 
motor vehicles contributed to climate change.161  In its standing analysis, the 
Court found that Massachusetts met the tests for injury, causation, and 
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redressability, despite the EPA’s arguments that the harms related to the 
agency’s refusal to regulate carbon emissions were too minimal, remote, and 
insignificant—in light of emissions from developing countries—to grant 
standing.162  The Court hinted that private parties might not be granted the 
same right as the Court granted Massachusetts in the case, noting the 
“considerable relevance that the party seeking review here is a sovereign 
State and not, as it was in Lujan, a private individual.”163 
The Court’s decision in American Electric II applied the concept of 
standing articulated in Massachusetts.164  By an equally divided 4-4 vote, the 
Court affirmed the Second Circuit’s decision that the plaintiffs had standing 
under Massachusetts in their public nuisance action against large electric 
utility providers.165  Though the Court did not distinguish between the two 
classes of plaintiffs, which included eight states and three nonprofit land 
trusts, it arguably expanded the scope of Massachusetts’s standing principle 
by applying it outside a statutory context.166 
The Court’s recent jurisprudence involving climate change issues signals 
that the concept of standing in climate change suits need not be limited to 
statutory claims and that climate injuries—though generally diffuse—can 
satisfy the injury and causation elements of the standing test.167  However, it 
remains unclear whether Massachusetts’s standing principles apply to private 
parties.168 
In suits advancing constitutional or rights-based arguments, the standing 
determinations are nearly uniformly stalled at the redressability phase.169  
Often, though a court may recognize that a plaintiff satisfies the injury and 
causation requirements, it will refrain from finding that the climate injury 
and alleged constitutional violation is redressable in the courts.170  At this 
juncture, the political question doctrine is often applied to determine that the 
case is not justiciable and to defer resolution to the political branches. 
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b.  The Political Question Doctrine 
In climate lawsuits filed against both the government and fossil fuel 
companies, defendants have often successfully argued that the court lacked 
jurisdiction under the political question doctrine.171  First articulated by Chief 
Justice John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison,172 the doctrine precludes from 
judicial review issues that are more appropriately addressed by the political 
branches.173  The parameters of the doctrine were solidified in Baker v. 
Carr,174 the landmark redistricting case where Justice William J. Brennan 
identified six criteria by which courts could identify political questions.175  
The first three Baker factors are most often applied176:  (1) a demonstrable 
commitment to a nonjudicial branch of government, (2) a lack of judicially 
manageable standards for resolving an issue, and (3) the impossibility of 
deciding the dispute without an initial policy choice clearly appropriate for 
nonjudicial discretion.177 
Because climate change is a global phenomenon exacerbated by multiple 
anthropogenic sources of greenhouse gases, some judges and commentators 
characterize the issue as presenting a nonjusticiable political question.178  For 
example, in Comer, the district court declined to find standing because the 
plaintiffs’ tort claims presented a nonjusticiable political question under the 
second and third Baker factors.179  The court concluded that the plaintiffs’ 
requested relief would necessarily require the judiciary to make policy 
determinations that were better suited to the legislative branch.180  Similarly, 
in Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co.181 (American Electric I), the 
Southern District of New York dismissed the nuisance suit as invoking a 
 
 171. See Blumm & Wood, supra note 7, at 31–32. 
 172. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 173. See id. at 170 (“Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution 
and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court.”). 
 174. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 175. See id. at 217; see also James R. May, Climate Change, Constitutional Consignment, 
and the Political Question Doctrine, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 919, 933 (2008). 
 176. See, e.g., Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 204 (2012) 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (describing the last three 
Baker factors, which were not cited by the majority, as addressing only prudential concerns); 
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 249 (2d Cir. 1995) (“The fourth through sixth Baker factors 
appear to be relevant only if judicial resolution of a question would contradict prior decisions 
taken by a political branch.”). 
 177. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.  The three other criteria are:  (4) “the impossibility of a court’s 
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate 
branches of government,” (5) “an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political 
decision already made,” and (6) “the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious 
pronouncements by various departments on one question.” Id. 
 178. See Jeff Todd, A “Sense of Equity” in Environmental Justice Litigation, 44 HARV. 
ENV’T L. REV. 169, 187 (2020). 
 179. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 2d 849, 865 (S.D. Miss. 2012), aff’d, 
718 F.3d 460 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 180. See id. 
 181. 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
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nonjusticiable political question.182  It applied the Baker factors to conclude 
that a suit seeking to compel utility companies to reduce their carbon 
emissions was not appropriate for judicial review, noting “the impossibility 
of deciding [the issue] without an initial policy determination of a kind 
clearly for nonjudicial discretion.”183 
Yet, other commentators emphasize the limits of the political question 
doctrine as articulated in Baker and suggest that its use by federal courts to 
dismiss climate change cases constitutes a liberal application of the 
doctrine.184  The Court in Baker acknowledged that some cases appearing to 
involve a nonjusticiable political question actually involve a “delicate 
exercise in constitutional interpretation” and recognized “the necessity for 
discriminating inquiry into the precise facts and posture of [a] particular 
case.”185  More recently, the Court has recognized that the political question 
doctrine constitutes a “narrow exception” to the judiciary’s “responsibility to 
decide cases properly before it.”186  Furthermore, because the Constitution 
does not assign authority over climate issues to the political branches, use of 
the first Baker factor to dismiss a climate change lawsuit would be 
premature.187 
C.  Case Study:  Juliana 
Judges have been reticent to extend jurisdiction over climate change suits, 
citing the restrictions imposed by various justiciability doctrines and the 
inability of the judiciary to address something as complicated, unwieldy, and 
technical as climate policy.188  However, a handful of recent cases have 
broken with this trend.  Most notably, Juliana could signal a growing shift 
and recognition of the need to reevaluate the role of the judiciary in 
adjudicating climate lawsuits.189 
 
 182. Id. at 272.  Interestingly, the Supreme Court did not explicitly address the political 
question doctrine in American Electric II.  Professor James R. May points out that the closest 
the Court came to engaging with the issue was when it noted that “[f]our members of the Court 
would hold that at least some plaintiffs have Article III standing under Massachusetts . . . and, 
further, that no other threshold obstacle bars review.” See James R. May, AEP v. Connecticut 
and the Future of the Political Question Doctrine, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 127, 129 (2011) 
(quoting American Electric II, 564 U.S. 410, 420 (2011)). 
 183. Id. (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004)). 
 184. See May, supra note 175, at 934–44. 
 185. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211, 217 (1962). 
 186. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 194–95 (2012). 
 187. See May, supra note 175, at 934, 939. 
 188. See, e.g., Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 883 
(N.D. Cal. 2009) (dismissing a climate nuisance suit as presenting a nonjusticiable political 
question), aff’d on other grounds, 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012); Kanuk ex rel. Kanuk v. State, 
Dep’t of Nat. Res., 335 P.3d 1088, 1097 (Alaska 2014) (dismissing three of the plaintiffs’ 
claims because they involved policy questions falling within the competence of the political 
branches of government); see also infra Part II.B.1. 
 189. Juliana II, 947 F.3d 1159, 1168 (9th Cir. 2020), reh’g denied, 986 F.3d 1295 (9th Cir. 
2021) (mem.). 
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To date, the Juliana litigation is one of the highest-profile climate change 
lawsuits in the United States.190  The twenty-one named individual plaintiffs, 
all between the ages of twelve and twenty-three, and two nonprofit 
organizations claim that the government’s ongoing support of the fossil fuel 
industry violates their “fundamental constitutional rights to life, liberty, and 
property” and also “discriminate[s] against . . . young citizens, who will 
disproportionately experience the destabilized climate system in our 
country.”191  The plaintiffs’ claims are indisputably ambitious and, as Judge 
Aiken of the District of Oregon noted in her denial of the government’s 
motion to dismiss, “[t]his is no ordinary lawsuit.”192  The suit has received 
extensive publicity and has been referred to in the media as “the trial of the 
century.”193 
The case notably presents constitutional claims as the primary bases for 
relief.  It implicates the same justiciability issues as those cases that involve 
statutory or tort claims but advances a bold and novel declaration that the 
federal government’s support of fossil fuel companies and general inaction 
on climate change violates fundamental rights.  The plaintiffs lean on the 
history of Obergefell to situate their argument within the modern expansion 
of substantive due process rights,194 urging the judiciary to recognize their 
constitutional right to a stable climate.195  The case is also notable because 
of the early victory its plaintiffs achieved at the trial court level; Judge Aiken 
found that the plaintiffs adequately met the standard for relief and recognized 
that climate change is an existential threat to the country that can be redressed 
by the courts.196 
1.  Procedural Posture 
In 2015, the plaintiffs filed suit in the District Court of Oregon against the 
federal government, then President Barack Obama, and several federal 
agencies alleging that the federal government promoted the use of fossil fuels 
despite knowing for over fifty years that the industry produced significant 
amounts of atmospheric carbon dioxide that contributed to climate change.197  
 
 190. See Levy, supra note 8, at 500. 
 191. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief ¶ 8, Juliana I, 217 F. 
Supp. 3d. 1224 (D. Or. 2016) (No. 15-cv-01517). 
 192. Juliana I, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1234. 
 193. See Chelsea Harvey, Trump Could Face the “Biggest Trial of the Century”—Over 
Climate Change, WASH. POST (Dec. 1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-
environment/wp/2016/12/01/trump-could-face-the-biggest-trial-of-the-century-over-climate-
change [https://perma.cc/K4J6-ZS2T]. 
 194. See First Amended Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, supra note 191, 
¶ 13. 
 195. See id. ¶ 96 (“[Plaintiffs] have an interest in ensuring that the climate system remains 
stable enough to secure their constitutional rights to life, liberty, and property, rights that 
depend on a livable future.”). 
 196. See Juliana I, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1261–63. 
 197. See First Amended Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, supra note 191, 
¶ 130 (“[Defendants] are primarily responsible for authorizing, permitting, and incentivizing 
fossil fuel production, consumption, transportation, and combustion, causing the atmospheric 
CO2 concentration to increase to at least 400 ppm and, thus, substantial harm to Plaintiffs.  
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The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief and argued that the 
defendants’ “deliberate indifference” and “dangerous interference with our 
atmosphere and climate system” violated their constitutional rights under the 
Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments and also violated the public trust 
doctrine.198  The defendants, along with intervenors the National Association 
of Manufacturers, the American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers, and 
the American Petroleum Institute, moved to dismiss for lack of standing and 
failure to state a claim.199  They also argued that the case presented a 
nonjusticiable political question.200 
Responding to the motion to dismiss, Judge Aiken adopted the magistrate 
judge’s findings and recommendations and denied the motion on November 
10, 2016, finding that there were “general factual allegations” in the case that 
were sufficient to establish Article III standing.201  The defendants asked the 
court to certify an interlocutory appeal of the order, which Judge Aiken 
denied on June 8, 2017.202  The government then applied twice to the Ninth 
Circuit for a writ of mandamus203 and once to the Supreme Court, all of 
which were denied.204  Judge Aiken subsequently denied a motion for 
summary judgment and again held that the plaintiffs had standing.205  The 
court found that the affidavits and expert testimony submitted by the 
plaintiffs met the standard of review to survive summary judgment, whereby 
a plaintiff must establish that there is a “genuine question of material fact as 
to the standing elements.”206 
The defendants made a renewed appeal to the Supreme Court,207 which 
stayed the case, only to vacate its own order nineteen days later.208  The Ninth 
Circuit then stayed the case and directed the district court to reconsider its 
decision regarding the interlocutory appeal, which the court did in November 
2018.209  The Ninth Circuit accepted the interlocutory appeal, again denied 
 
Defendants have failed to preserve a habitable climate system for present and future 
generations, and instead have created dangerous levels of atmospheric CO2 concentrations.”). 
 198. Id. ¶¶ 8, 286. 
 199. See Federal Defendants’ Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of their 
Motion to Dismiss at 1, Juliana I, 217 F. Supp. 3d. 1224 (No. 15-cv-01517), 2015 WL 
13850596. 
 200. See Memorandum in Support of Intervenor-Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 11, 
Juliana I, 217 F. Supp. 3d. 1224 (No. 15-cv-01517), 2015 WL 7587592. 
 201. Juliana I, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1268. 
 202. Juliana v. United States, No. 15-cv-01517, 2017 WL 2483705 (D. Or. June 8, 2017). 
 203. In re United States, 884 F.3d 830, 836 (9th Cir. 2018); In re United States, 895 F.3d 
1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 204. United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 139 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2018).  The Supreme Court found that 
“[t]he breadth of respondents’ claims is striking . . . and the justiciability of those claims 
presents substantial grounds for difference of opinion.” Id. 
 205. Juliana v. United States, 339 F. Supp. 3d 1062, 1086 (D. Or. 2018).  
 206. Id. at 1086–87. 
 207. In re United States, 139 S. Ct. 452, 453 (2018). 
 208. See Robin Kundis Craig, Juliana, Climate Change, and the Constitution, NAT. RES. & 
ENV’T, Summer 2020, at 53, 54. 
 209. Juliana v. United States, No. 15-CV-01517, 2018 WL 6303774, at *3 (D. Or. Nov. 21, 
2018). 
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mandamus, and heard oral argument in the case in June 2019.210  A number 
of amicus briefs were filed in support of the plaintiffs and defendants, 
including one by members of both chambers of the U.S. Congress in support 
of the plaintiffs.211 
In January 2020, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary 
judgment decision and concluded that the plaintiffs had not satisfied the 
redressability prong required to establish standing.212  In February 2021, the 
Ninth Circuit denied plaintiffs’ petition for rehearing en banc on the court’s 
January 2020 ruling.213  The plaintiffs have since indicated that they intend 
to seek a writ of certiorari.214 
2.  Arguments Presented 
The plaintiffs present four grounds for relief.215  First, the plaintiffs assert 
that the government’s knowledge of and failure to regulate carbon pollution 
constitutes a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as 
it deprives plaintiffs of “their fundamental rights to life, liberty, and 
property.”216  Second, the plaintiffs contend that the government’s 
“aggregate acts” violate the equal protection principles found in the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.217  The plaintiffs argue that they and future 
generations constitute a protected class and that the government’s “de facto 
policy choice to favor influential and entrenched short-term fossil fuel energy 
interests” disproportionally discriminates against them.218  Third, plaintiffs 
allege that a right to a stable climate system is inalienable and fundamental 
and is an implicit right under the Ninth Amendment.219  Finally, the plaintiffs 
argue that the government has violated its duty of care as a sovereign trustee 
under the public trust doctrine.220  Citing Obergefell, the plaintiffs seek a 
declaration that the government’s support of carbon emissions violates their 
constitutional rights to life, liberty, and property and request injunctive relief 
in the form of an order directing the government to “prepare and implement 
an enforceable national remedial plan to phase out fossil fuel emissions and 
draw down excess atmospheric CO2.”221 
 
 210. See Craig, supra note 208, at 54. 
 211. See Brief of Members of the United States Congress in Support of Plaintiffs-
Appellees, Juliana v. United States, 986 F.3d 1295 (9th Cir. 2021) (mem.) (No. 18-36082), 
2019 WL 1072495. 
 212. See Juliana II, 947 F.3d 1159, 1171 (9th Cir. 2020), reh’g denied 986 F.3d 1295. 
 213. See Juliana v. United States, 986 F.3d 1295; see also Petition for Rehearing En Banc 
of Plaintiffs-Appellees, Juliana, 986 F.3d 1295 (No. 18-36082). 
 214. See Motion to Stay the Mandate Pending Filing & Disposition of a Petition for a Writ 
of Certiorari of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 1, Juliana, 986 F.3d 1295 (No. 18-36082). 
 215. See First Amended Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, supra note 191, 
¶¶ 286, 291, 303, 308. 
 216. Id. ¶ 280. 
 217. Id. ¶ 292. 
 218. Id. ¶ 298. 
 219. See id. ¶¶ 303–04. 
 220. See id. ¶ 310. 
 221. Id. ¶ 7. 
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In response, the government argues that the plaintiffs fail to satisfy all three 
standing requirements articulated in Lujan.222  It contends that the alleged 
harms constitute generalized grievances rather than the requisite “personal 
and individual”223 injury and that the alleged causal chain is similarly 
insufficient.224  The government argues that the plaintiffs do not satisfy the 
redressability prong, as the requested relief “lies outside this [c]ourt’s 
competence and jurisdiction.”225  The government further asserts that the 
plaintiffs fail to state a claim because there is no constitutional right to be 
free of carbon emissions and rejects the notion that plaintiffs constitute a 
protected class.226  Finally, the government rejects the plaintiffs’ public trust 
claims and argues that the public trust doctrine is a function of state, not 
federal, law.227 
3.  The District Court’s Decision 
On November 10, 2016, Judge Aiken found that the court had jurisdiction 
over the claims on the grounds that the plaintiffs satisfied the standing 
requirements and that the claims did not present nonjusticiable political 
questions.228  In coming to this conclusion, Judge Aiken conducted a detailed 
analysis of the Baker factors.229  As to the first factor, which dictates deferral 
of issues that are “textually committed to a coordinate political 
department,”230 Judge Aiken noted that “climate change policy is not a 
fundamental power on which any other power allocated exclusively to other 
branches of government rests”231 and found that “climate change policy is 
not inherently, or even primarily, a foreign policy decision.”232  Judge Aiken 
proceeded to analyze the second and third Baker factors,233 which “reflect 
circumstances in which a dispute calls for decisionmaking beyond courts’ 
competence.”234  Noting that the plaintiffs sought declaratory relief directing 
agencies to prepare a national carbon emissions reduction plan, rather than 
“ad-hoc policy determinations” by the court to “pinpoint the ‘best’ emissions 
 
 222. See Federal Defendants’ Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of Their 
Motion to Dismiss at 7–8, Juliana I, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. 2016) (No. 15-cv-01517), 
2015 WL 13850596. 
 223. Id. at 10 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 n.1 (1992)). 
 224. See id. at 13. 
 225. Id. at 14–15. 
 226. See id. at 24 (“Plaintiffs are clearly not differently situated from any other person of 
any age when it comes to the alleged current impacts of climate change.”). 
 227. See id. at 28. 
 228. See Juliana I, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1235–48 (D. Or. 2016), rev’d and remanded, 947 
F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020). 
 229. See id. at 1237–42. 
 230. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 203 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring). 
 231. Juliana I, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1237–38. 
 232. Id. at 1238. 
 233. Id. at 1238–39. 
 234. Zivotofsky, 566 U.S. at 203. 
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level,” Judge Aiken held that issuing the requested declaration was within 
the court’s ability.235 
Judge Aiken acknowledged that the claims implicated political issues but 
held that the case rested “squarely within the purview of the judiciary” 
because it alleged a violation of constitutional rights.236  Judge Aiken noted 
that though the courts “cannot intervene to assert ‘better’ policy . . . they can 
address constitutional violations by government agencies and provide 
equitable relief.”237  The Juliana district court further found that the plaintiffs 
provided sufficient factual specificity to survive a motion to dismiss and 
concluded that such specificity was not diluted by the breadth of the 
plaintiffs’ claims.238 
4.  The Ninth Circuit’s Decision 
On January 17, 2020, by a 2-1 vote, a Ninth Circuit panel reversed the 
district court’s decision, finding that it was “beyond the power of an Article 
III court to order, design, supervise, or implement the plaintiffs’ requested 
remedial plan” and that the plaintiffs consequently lacked standing.239  In the 
Ninth Circuit’s view, designing or ordering a plan sufficient to vindicate the 
plaintiffs’ claims would “implicate the separation of powers,” as it would 
require addressing questions better entrusted to the political branches.240 
However, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that the 
plaintiffs satisfied the injury and causation requirements for standing.241  The 
court noted that the plaintiffs’ injuries were “not simply ‘conjectural’ or 
‘hypothetical’” but that they constituted concrete and particularized 
injuries.242  The court also found that “the causal chain here is sufficiently 
established” and that there was a “genuine factual dispute as to whether [the 
government’s] policies were a ‘substantial factor’ in causing the plaintiffs’ 
injuries.”243 
The court of appeals acknowledged that the executive and legislative 
branches had arguably abdicated responsibility in the face of an 
“environmental apocalypse.”244  Judge Andrew D. Hurwitz noted that the 
 
 235. Juliana I, 217 F.Supp.3d at 1238–39 (“[T]he crux of th[e political question] inquiry 
is . . . not whether the case is unmanageable in the sense of being large, complicated, or 
otherwise difficult to tackle from a logistical standpoint . . . [but rather whether] a legal 
framework exists by which courts can evaluate . . . claims in a reasoned manner.” (alteration 
in the original) (quoting Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 552, 555 (9th Cir. 2005))). 
 236. Id. at 1241. 
 237. Id. at 1270. 
 238. Id. at 1262 (“This lawsuit may be groundbreaking, but that fact does not alter the legal 
standards governing the motion to dismiss.”). 
 239. Juliana II, 947 F.3d 1159, 1171 (9th Cir. 2020), reh’g denied, 986 F.3d 1295 (9th Cir. 
2021) (mem.). 
 240. Id. at 1173.  “[T]he plaintiffs’ impressive case for redress must be presented to the 
political branches of government.” Id. at 1165. 
 241. Id. at 1168–69. 
 242. Id. at 1168 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). 
 243. Id. at 1169 (quoting Mendia v. Garcia, 768 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2014)). 
 244. Id. at 1164. 
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“substantial evidentiary record” demonstrated that the federal government 
promoted fossil fuel use despite knowing that it caused “catastrophic climate 
change.”245  Although concluding that the plaintiffs’ “impressive case for 
redress” was beyond the purview of the court, the Ninth Circuit devoted a 
substantial portion of the opinion to affirming the alleged causal chain and 
recognizing that the plaintiffs suffered a particularized harm resulting from 
the federal government’s active and detrimental promotion of fossil fuel 
use.246 
Writing in dissent, Judge Josephine L. Stanton argued that the majority’s 
deference to the political branches and application of the political question 
doctrine ran counter to the judiciary’s “constitutional mandate to intervene 
where the political branches run afoul of our foundational principles.”247  
Judge Stanton argued that the reprieve sought by the plaintiffs was similar to 
the “desegregation orders and statewide prison injunction the Supreme Court 
ha[d] sanctioned” in other cases and noted that, in the past, the judiciary’s 
adherence to constitutional values had initiated widespread changes in 
government.248  Citing a consistency with historical practices, Judge Stanton 
asserted that plaintiffs’ request for relief was neither novel nor nonjusticiable 
and that scientific complexity did not place it beyond the bounds of the 
court’s jurisdiction.249 
II.  THE VIABILITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS 
Climate change plaintiffs alleging constitutional violations necessarily 
encounter procedural hurdles and substantive difficulties resulting from the 
novelty of these claims.  The diffuse nature of global warming poses a 
challenge for plaintiffs attempting to meet the particularity requirement of 
federal standing requirements, and the lack of a federally recognized right to 
a stable environment may appear facially insurmountable. 
Yet, the procedural posture of Juliana and recent scholarship evaluating 
these constitutional claims point to a growing consensus that constitutional 
claims brought by climate change plaintiffs are viable.  Part II.A examines 
the arguments in support of constitutional claims.  Part II.B reviews the 
arguments against bringing constitutional claims. 
 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. at 1165, 1169. 
 247. Id. at 1184 (Stanton, J., dissenting). 
 248. Id. at 1176, 1188–89 (“[O]ur history is no stranger to widespread, programmatic 
changes in government functions ushered in by the judiciary’s commitment to requiring 
adherence to the Constitution. . . .  [C]onsistent with our historical practices, [plaintiffs’] 
request is a recognition that remedying decades of institutionalized violations may take some 
time.”). 
 249. See id. at 1189 (“Mere complexity, however, does not put the issue out of the courts’ 
reach.  Neither the government nor the majority has articulated why the courts could not weigh 
scientific and prudential consideration—as we often do—to put the government on a path to 
constitutional compliance.”). 
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A.  Constitutional Claims Are Viable 
Part II.A.1 evaluates the procedural arguments in favor of granting 
standing to climate change plaintiffs.  Part II.A.2 reviews the argument that 
the constitutional right to a stable climate should be recognized as an 
unenumerated right inherent in the Constitution. 
1.  In Support of Standing 
Though the injury, causation, and redressability prongs of the Lujan test 
would appear fatal to climate change litigants, recent case law has 
demonstrated that plaintiffs are able to satisfy most, if not all, of these 
standing requirements even when alleging harms stemming from global 
warming.250 
Courts have held that evidence of concrete climate change harms incurred 
by plaintiffs can satisfy the injury-in-fact prong of Lujan, which requires that 
the injury be “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”251  In 
Juliana, for example, each of the thirty-three plaintiffs described in great 
detail the damage that climate change had wrought.252  Plaintiff Xiuhtezcatl 
M. alleged that increased wildfires and floods jeopardized his and his 
family’s safety, plaintiff Sahara V. alleged that wildfires aggravated her 
asthma, and plaintiff Jayden F. detailed how her family’s home flooded as a 
result of floods exacerbated by climate change.253  The district court held that 
all the plaintiffs were harmed personally and economically and that the harms 
were “concrete and particularized, not abstract or indefinite.”254 
In addition, imminent climate injuries can also be a sufficient injury in fact.  
In Massachusetts, the Supreme Court recognized that projected greenhouse 
gas emissions would exacerbate global warming and result in the potential 
future loss of coastal lands in Massachusetts and held that this imminent harm 
qualified as a sufficient injury in fact.255  The Court further explained that 
the generalized nature of the harm did not preclude Massachusetts’s interest 
in preventing such losses and was not a barrier to finding standing.256 
Though the precedential effect of Massachusetts remains unclear due to 
the Court’s specific recognition that the state’s “quasi-sovereign interests” 
entitled it to “special solicitude” in the standing analysis, the Court’s holding 
demonstrates that the diffuse effects of climate harms do not preclude a 
finding of standing.257  Indeed, the majority’s choice in Massachusetts to 
 
 250. See supra Part I.B.2.a. 
 251. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 
495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)). 
 252. See First Amended Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, supra note 191, 
¶¶ 16–97. 
 253. See Juliana I, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1242–43 (D. Or. 2016), rev’d and remanded, 947 
F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020). 
 254. Id. at 1244. 
 255. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 523–25 (2007). 
 256. See id. at 522. 
 257. Id. at 520, 522 (“[W]here a harm is concrete, though widely shared, the Court has 
found ‘injury in fact.’” (quoting FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998))). 
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eschew the rigid formulations of Lujan and its findings elsewhere that “an 
injury . . . widely shared . . . does not, by itself, automatically disqualify an 
interest for Article III purposes”258 demonstrate the willingness of the Court 
to loosen judge-made standing requirements in cases involving imminent and 
generalized climate threats.259  Similarly, in Juliana, the district court found 
that the plaintiffs suffered both actual and imminent harms because the 
effects of global warming were likely to continue or accelerate over time.260 
The diffuse impact of climate change has also been found to satisfy the 
causation requirement of standing.  To show causation, plaintiffs must 
establish that the injury is “fairly traceable to the challenged action of the 
defendant.”261  In cases brought against governments for failing to regulate 
or reduce carbon emissions adequately, the Supreme Court has held that 
causation is satisfied where the challenged emissions levels meaningfully 
contribute to global climate change.262  In Juliana, the Ninth Circuit affirmed 
the district court’s findings that the plaintiffs satisfied injury and causation 
for the purposes of summary judgment because there existed a genuine 
dispute regarding whether or not federal policies were a “substantial factor” 
in the plaintiffs’ injuries.263  The court noted that the causal chain between 
the plaintiffs’ injuries and fossil fuel industry activities was “sufficiently 
established” and that the plaintiffs had demonstrated that “federal subsidies 
and leases have increased those emissions.”264 
Causation in cases involving future climate harms is largely dependent on 
scientific attribution.265  Detection and attribution science links 
anthropogenic factors to climate change impacts and analyzes the extent to 
which human activity affects the chemical composition of the atmosphere, 
contributing to extreme weather events or local climates.266  Though many 
courts have recognized that causation relating to potential harms requires a 
fact-specific inquiry, others have dismissed climate change plaintiffs for lack 
of standing based on cursory assessments that the casual chains are too 
attenuated.267  As methods of attribution continue to improve, scientific 
evaluations of causation will remain pivotal to a courts’ standing analyses, 
particularly as they pertain to causation.268 
 
 258. FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998). 
 259. See Ian R. Curry, Note, Establishing Climate Change Standing:  A New Approach, 36 
PACE ENV’T L. REV. 297, 318 (2019). 
 260. See Juliana I, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1244 (D. Or. 2016), rev’d and remanded, 947 
F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020). 
 261. Juliana II, 947 F.3d at 1181 (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016)). 
 262. See Burger et al., supra note 2, at 150. 
 263. Juliana II, 947 F.3d at 1169 (quoting Mendia v. Garcia, 768 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 
2014)). 
 264. Id. 
 265. See Burger et al., supra note 2, at 153–54. 
 266. See id. at 78. 
 267. See id. at 226. 
 268. See id. at 239 (“[T]he recent waves of cases brought against national and subnational 
governments . . . have made the relationship between the science and law of climate change 
attribution all the more salient.”); see also United Nations Env’t Programme, supra note 1, at 
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Alternatively, some scholars argue that causation should be considered 
through a proximate cause analysis rather than a strict causation-in-fact 
inquiry.269  Citing standing as playing a gatekeeping role, courts have 
generally applied a specific cause-in-fact inquiry that is at odds with the 
standing question being a mere threshold determination.270  A proximate 
cause analysis, by contrast, would allow courts to ascertain whether an 
alleged violation was a cause—rather than the strictly interpreted “but for” 
cause—of the petitioner’s injuries.271  Still other commentators assert that 
traceable standing does not require proximate causation but that only 
“plausible evidence of a link” between the defendant’s conduct and the 
plaintiff’s harm would suffice to serve the standing doctrine’s procedural 
role.272 
Furthermore, the Court signaled in Massachusetts that causation of climate 
change harms could be satisfied by both parties’ acknowledgment of the 
causal chain.273  The pliability of the causation analysis from Lujan, coupled 
with attribution science, may enable plaintiffs to satisfy this standing 
requirement more regularly.274  The Supreme Court in Massachusetts and the 
Ninth Circuit and district court in Juliana all found that the plaintiffs had met 
the injury and causation requirements for standing.275 
The third prong of Lujan—redressability—is generally the most difficult 
prong for climate litigants to satisfy.  Courts often find that justiciability 
principles preclude the judicial review of cases involving climate claims, 
noting that regulation is the more appropriate response to climate change.276  
Courts often cite the political question doctrine in particular as the reason for 
dismissing climate lawsuits because democratically elected branches are 
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better equipped to make policy determinations that involve scientific 
evidence, economic repercussions, and complex political calculations.277 
Yet, the tendency of lower courts to defer climate change issues to the 
political branches involves a broad application of the political question 
doctrine.278  Deferral based on the first of the six Baker factors—“a textually 
demonstrable constitutional commitment . . . to a coordinate political 
department”279—is complicated by the fact that climate issues are not 
textually committed to any branch.280 
In the context of a standing analysis, the political question doctrine need 
not preclude redress for climate litigants.  The Juliana district court applied 
the Baker factors in its analysis of the redressability prong and explained that 
“redressability does not require certainty” but rather the “substantial 
likelihood that the Court could provide meaningful relief.”281  In considering 
the plaintiffs’ request for declaratory and injunctive relief to “swiftly phase 
out CO2 emissions,” the court found that the plaintiffs had sufficiently 
demonstrated that the relief sought would at least partially alleviate their 
injuries, and it subsequently granted standing.282  Some scholars have also 
noted that concerns about the political question doctrine’s “basic 
illegitimacy”283 and its constitutional validity should preclude such a broad 
application.284 
Finally, plaintiffs alleging a violation of constitutional rights present 
claims that are appropriate for judicial review.  The Juliana district court 
found that a determination of whether the defendants had violated the 
plaintiffs’ constitutional rights was well within the judiciary’s authority.285  
In response to the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the district court observed 
that “federal courts retain broad authority ‘to fashion practical remedies when 
confronted with complex and intractable constitutional violations’” and that 
any “speculation about the difficulty of crafting a remedy could not support 
dismissal at this early stage.”286  Writing in dissent to the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision, Judge Stanton argued that the court should “not otherwise abdicate 
[its] duty to enforce constitutional rights” and emphasized that there is “no 
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justiciability exception for cases of great complexity and magnitude.”287  In 
response to allegations of climate harms, some judges and scholars note that 
the scientifically complex nature of climate change policy should not bar 
plaintiffs from a consideration of their rights-based claims on the merits.288 
2.  Recognizing Federal Environmental Rights 
Fundamental rights are those enumerated in the Constitution or those that 
are either “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition”289 or 
“fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty.”290  Though the Supreme 
Court has cautioned against a liberal application of the Due Process Clauses 
to recognize unenumerated rights, the Court also has a history of identifying 
implicit fundamental rights that are inherent in the Constitution.291  These 
include the right to privacy, the right to travel interstate, and the right to 
vote.292  When the Supreme Court recognized the constitutional right to 
same-sex marriage in Obergefell, it famously asserted that “[w]hen new 
insight reveals discord between the Constitution’s central protections and a 
received legal stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed.”293  There, the 
Court recognized the judiciary’s ability to “exercise reasoned judgment in 
identifying interests of the person so fundamental that the State must accord 
them its respect.”294 
The district court in Juliana is alone in recognizing the fundamental right 
to a stable climate.295  The plaintiffs argued that the right to a stable climate 
system constituted an implicit liberty protected by the Ninth Amendment and 
that it was inalienable, natural, and “[f]undamental to our scheme of ordered 
liberty.”296  Relying on the Supreme Court’s fundamental rights 
jurisprudence, the district court applied its “reasoned judgment” to find that 
“the right to a climate system capable of sustaining human life is fundamental 
to a free and ordered society” and is “a necessary condition to exercising 
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other rights to life, liberty, and property.”297  Judge Aiken rejected the notion 
of broadly constitutionalizing all environmental claims but explained that a 
claim alleging that government inaction would affirmatively cause death, 
shorten life spans, cause damage to property, undermine food sources, and 
substantially change the ecosystem qualified as a due process violation.298 
Another potential source of environmental rights is the public trust 
doctrine.299  Courts have understood the public trust doctrine as a state 
obligation, based on the interpretation that the Supreme Court, in Illinois 
Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois,300 situated the doctrine in state law.301  
However, some commentators and judges have characterized these 
interpretations as dicta that erroneously reads the doctrine’s foundation in the 
law of any state to mean that it is limited to only state law.302  Instead, 
scholars contend that the Supreme Court’s decision in Illinois Central was 
grounded in federal common law and that the public trust doctrine applies 
both to state and to federal governments in their capacities as sovereigns.303 
The Juliana district court agreed with this interpretation of the doctrine, 
finding that safeguarding the environment was an inherent sovereign 
responsibility and could not be abdicated by the state.304  The court explained 
that the plaintiffs’ claims regarding the impact of government inaction on 
ocean acidification and rising seas fell within the traditional scope of the 
public trust doctrine.305  Finding that public trust rights, though 
unenumerated, are consistent with the country’s history and tradition and 
implicit in its scheme of ordered liberty, Judge Aiken held that plaintiffs’ 
public trust claims both predated the Constitution and properly sounded in 
the Ninth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.306 
A modern iteration of the public trust doctrine extends its reach to include 
the atmosphere.  The “atmospheric trust” theory characterizes the atmosphere 
as a public natural resource and a public trust asset for which governments 
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hold fiduciary duties in their capacities as trustees.307  The Juliana plaintiffs 
advanced arguments under this theory by challenging the federal 
government’s support of the fossil fuel industry and by seeking a judicial 
order requiring it to implement an enforceable carbon emission reduction 
plan.308  In light of existing air pollution regulations, proponents of the 
atmospheric trust doctrine argue that adjudicating climate cases involving 
atmospheric trust violations necessitates the judiciary’s engagement with 
expert testimony and scientific attribution.309 
B.  Countervailing Arguments 
Despite the recent successes discussed in Part II.A, federal courts have 
generally found that adjudicating climate harms exceeds the parameters of 
judicial review.  Part II.B.1 reviews the arguments against standing, and Part 
II.B.2 examines the case against recognizing the right to a stable 
environment. 
1.  Justiciable Barriers 
The majority of climate change cases in federal court have been dismissed 
on procedural grounds without consideration of the merits.310  Where courts 
have recognized that climate change can produce sufficient injuries in fact, 
they often find that plaintiffs fail to satisfy causation or, increasingly, dismiss 
those cases on justiciability grounds. 
In Washington Environmental Council v. Bellon,311 the Ninth Circuit 
dismissed an effort by nonprofit plaintiffs to hold Washington State 
accountable for its failure to regulate greenhouse gas emissions.312  Though 
the plaintiffs’ injuries were sufficiently specific to satisfy the injury-in-fact 
prong, the court of appeals found that the alleged causal chain “consist[ed] 
of a series of links strung together by conclusory, generalized statements of 
‘contribution,’ without any plausible scientific or other evidentiary basis that 
the refineries’ emissions are the source of their injuries.”313  The court cited 
the “limited scientific capability in assessing, detecting, or measuring the 
relationship between a certain [greenhouse gas] emission source and 
localized climate impacts” as a reason for finding the causal chain too 
tenuous to find standing.314  Similarly, the district court in Kivalina found 
that the plaintiffs lacked standing because other factors, in addition to the 
activities of the defendant oil companies, contributed to the emissions levels 
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that caused the plaintiffs’ injuries.315  The court did not specify a particular 
threshold of emissions necessary to find standing, but one scholar suggests 
that the court would have come to the same conclusion notwithstanding the 
quantity of the emissions.316 
Courts have almost uniformly held that redress for climate change injuries 
presents a nonjusticiable political question.317  Despite the district court’s 
grant of standing to the Juliana plaintiffs, the Ninth Circuit held that the 
plaintiffs failed to satisfy the redressability requirement.318  The Ninth 
Circuit explained that, to establish redressability, plaintiffs must demonstrate 
that the relief sought is “(1) substantially likely to redress their injuries, and 
(2) within the . . . court’s power to award.”319  Though redress need not be 
guaranteed, it must be more than “merely speculative.”320  The court found 
that granting declaratory relief to the Juliana plaintiffs would not sufficiently 
redress their injuries and that an injunction would stymie both the executive 
and congressional branches from exercising their respective discretionary 
authority over environmental policy.321  It explained that a comprehensive 
plan to decrease carbon emissions—though laudatory from a policy 
standpoint and as “a matter of national survival in particular”—would 
necessarily involve “complex policy decisions entrusted, for better or worse, 
to the wisdom and discretion of the executive and legislative branches.”322 
In his dissent in Massachusetts, Chief Justice Roberts also advocated for 
deference to the political branches.323  Characterizing the plaintiffs’ injuries 
first as a generalized grievance, Chief Justice Roberts criticized the 
majority’s finding that the plaintiffs’ alleged harms were sufficiently 
concrete and particularized.324  Moving to redressability, he argued that 
dissatisfaction with the pace at which the political branches addressed global 
warming did not change the fact that Congress and the executive branch are 
better equipped than the judiciary to address the issue and that the majority’s 
flexible adherence to the standing doctrine threatened the Constitution’s 
tripartite allocation of power.325 
The reticence of the judiciary to find standing of climate change plaintiffs 
rests on its discomfort with ruling on issues related to global warming.  
Democratically elected officials are deemed to be the more appropriate 
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promulgators of climate policy, better equipped to make decisions that 
implicate economic and social trade-offs.326  In the words of the Ninth Circuit 
in Juliana, “[t]hat the other branches may have abdicated their responsibility 
to remediate the problem does not confer on Article III courts, no matter how 
well-intentioned, the ability to step into their shoes.”327 
2.  The Lack of a Constitutional Right Is Preclusive 
Regarding a fundamental environmental right, courts consistently cite the 
lack of an enumerated constitutional right to a stable environment as a reason 
for denying a constitutional claim.328  There have been two attempts to 
amend the Constitution to include a right to a healthy environment, and both 
have failed.329  In response to efforts to analogize climate change plaintiffs’ 
efforts to those of same-sex marriage advocates, scholars have disputed 
Obergefell’s concept of expanding due process rights and noted the case’s 
lack of precedential value in the realm of environmental rights.330  Citing 
Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent in Obergefell, which criticized the majority 
for granting too much discretion to the judiciary to expand fundamental 
rights, one commentator argues that it is “inappropriate in a democratic 
system for judges to use injunctive relief to force the political branches to 
make policy choices that a federal judge prefers.”331  Instead of seeking relief 
in the courts, proponents of this view note that constituents should instead 
make use of the electoral process. 
In Juliana, the government similarly contested the plaintiffs’ invocation of 
Obergefell.  It argued that comparisons to Obergefell were misplaced 
because the right to a stable climate system “has no relationship to ‘certain 
personal choices central to individual dignity’” or any right as “‘fundamental 
as a matter of history or tradition’ as the right to marry.”332  The Ninth Circuit 
noted, however, that “[r]easonable jurists can disagree about whether the 
asserted constitutional right” to a climate system capable of sustaining human 
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life exists but ultimately sidestepped the question by finding that the 
plaintiffs lacked standing.333 
Scholars also argue that applying the public trust doctrine to climate 
change cases overextends the doctrine.334  One commentator characterizes 
the doctrine as paradoxical, noting that it combines expectations about a 
government’s role as a trustee of natural resources with “an incompletely 
theorized doctrinal foundation and anxiety about judicial policy-making on 
technically complex and socially important issues.”335  Expansion of the 
public trust doctrine beyond its traditional application to aquatic resources 
must also be reconciled with questions about its legal effect and the 
judiciary’s competence in enforcing it.336  While scholars generally 
recognize that reducing carbon emissions is a laudatory goal, many also warn 
against applying the public trust doctrine too broadly to compel climate 
change reform.337 
Indeed, even the scholar whose landmark article arguably resuscitated the 
public trust doctrine in legal discourse simultaneously cautioned against its 
overextension.338  In 1970, Professor Joseph Sax published “The Public Trust 
Doctrine in Natural Resource Law:  Effective Judicial Intervention,” which 
suggested that the public trust doctrine could be applied more broadly to 
protect natural resources in the face of insufficient legislation.339  Despite 
Professor Sax’s thesis and the expansionist interpretations that followed, he 
also stressed that the doctrine should not engender direct confrontation 
between the legislative and judicial branches.340  He noted that the doctrine 
should not be utilized to “displac[e] legislative bodies as the final authorities 
in setting resource policies.”341  Furthermore, in a discussion of regulatory 
takings, he noted that “a private action seeking more effective governmental 
action on . . . more extensive enforcement of air pollution laws would rarely 
be likely to reach constitutional limits.”342  Though his comments pertained 
to takings of private property, his skepticism that such claims would reach 
their “constitutional limits” suggests that he would be equally skeptical of the 
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viability of “grandiose constitutional claims of the right to a decent 
environment.”343 
III.  THE CASE FOR JUDICIAL ENGAGEMENT 
This part argues that methodical judicial deference to the political branches 
on issues of climate change policy amounts to an abdication of responsibility.  
It proposes that courts find climate change litigants have standing, and it 
argues that their constitutional claims deserve review on the merits.  This part 
also argues that an environmental right is inherent in enumerated 
constitutional liberties and should be recognized. 
A.  Constitutional Climate Claims Should Be Reviewed on the Merits 
Until now, federal courts have almost uniformly invoked threshold 
principles such as standing and the political question doctrine to avoid 
reaching the merits on constitutional claims in climate change lawsuits.344  
Judicial unease about usurping the role of the political branches and 
displacing democratic processes, though valid, does not justify the blanket 
refusal to engage with climate change lawsuits that allege constitutional 
violations.  As two commentators have noted, judges “have found ways to 
decline jurisdiction over extraordinary claims for relief.  But the routinization 
of the hermeneutic of jurisdiction does not render it legitimate.”345 
First, allegations that federal emissions practices violate constitutional 
rights fall directly within the scope of the judiciary’s authority and should 
not be dismissed for a lack of standing.346  The standing doctrine acts as a 
procedural threshold for plaintiffs but is mired by several fundamental flaws, 
which results in its inconsistent application and overall pliability.347  In 
addition, the standing analysis of climate change claims often appears to 
overlap with a premature merits analysis, even though standing should 
primarily be a jurisdictional question.348  As a threshold doctrine, standing 
should not be utilized to bar review of claims that pertain to constitutional 
violations simply because of the difficult questions these claims present.349 
Instead, courts should find that climate change plaintiffs satisfy the 
jurisdictional standing requirements as articulated in Lujan.350  Climate 
change litigants’ ability to satisfy the first two prongs of standing has been 
well established.351  With regard to the redressability requirement, the 
difficulty of fashioning an effective remedy that respects the separation of 
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powers should not disqualify litigants at this procedural stage.352  Plaintiffs 
are not required to show that judicial relief would completely or certainly 
ameliorate their injuries; rather, they need only show that there is a 
substantial likelihood that it would do so and that the redress would, at a 
minimum, reduce the alleged harm.353  Arguments that declaratory or 
injunctive relief would not rectify the entirety of anthropogenic climate 
change are therefore unavailing.354  Furthermore, the causation and 
redressability elements of standing were initially conceived of as two sides 
of the same coin or “two facets of a single causation requirement.”355  The 
interconnectedness of these two prongs and the proven ability of climate 
change plaintiffs to demonstrate causation suggests that redressability should 
not be the preclusive measure that the courts have deemed it to be.356 
Second, courts’ tendency to deny standing based on cursory scientific 
evaluations denies climate change plaintiffs the full quantitative analysis they 
deserve.  Attribution science is crucial for demonstrating causation in climate 
cases and demands the extensive evidence, expert testimony, and full briefing 
that comes with discovery.357  Questions of redressability, in particular, rely 
on detailed scientific attribution research, which courts can only adequately 
consider once plaintiffs have passed the standing threshold.358  Dismissing a 
lawsuit that is dependent on attribution science without considering the 
science itself is inappropriately premature. 
Third, rejecting a climate change complaint for presenting a nonjusticiable 
political question constitutes an overbroad application of the political 
question doctrine.  In exercising judicial restraint on climate change matters, 
such that nearly all climate-related claims are deferred to the political 
branches, courts fail to exercise the appropriate extent of their 
constitutionally delegated authority.359  One of the judiciary’s central roles 
is to ensure the protection of people’s rights, whether granted by statute, 
enumerated in the Constitution, or derived from substantive due process.360  
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Courts are therefore well within their power to intervene when the 
government’s actions or policies allegedly violate the rights of its citizens.361 
Moreover, the political question doctrine itself is a permissive gatekeeping 
doctrine that enables judicial deference in cases that present a political issue.  
The difficulty in discerning what is too political, or not political enough, to 
justify the exercise of the doctrine enables its selective and arguably liberal 
application.362  One scholar notes that “[f]or too many judges, the temptation 
to view especially delicate or controversial matters as ‘political,’ and 
therefore beyond their reach, can and has become seductive.”363  In climate 
change cases, judges often note that the political complexity of addressing 
global warming requires its exclusive resolution by the executive and 
legislative branches.364  Yet, the scale and complexity of the issue does not 
excuse the judiciary’s systematic refusal to engage.365  In Juliana, the Ninth 
Circuit acknowledged that the political branches had abdicated their 
responsibility to remediate the problem, but by refusing to find standing, the 
court arguably abdicated its own responsibility to serve as a check on the 
other coequal branches.366  By declining to review cases on the merits, courts 
knowingly perpetuate what they acknowledge to be insufficient government 
reactions to climate change. 
B.  The Right to a Stable Climate System 
The Juliana district court recognized that the right to a stable climate 
system is “quite literally the foundation ‘of society, without which there 
would be neither civilization nor progress.’”367  The court qualified this 
finding by clarifying that it was not identifying a right to be completely free 
from pollution or climate change but rather, recognizing that a claim that 
government policies contribute to climate change and thereby substantially 
threaten conditions necessary to enjoy life, liberty, and property is sufficient 
to allege an infringement of one’s fundamental rights.368 
The court’s narrow holding regarding the right to a climate system capable 
of supporting human life demonstrates the possibility of recognizing an 
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environmental right of a limited scope.369  Despite the lack of a federally 
recognized environmental right, it is undisputed that a stable climate is a 
necessary condition of the fundamental rights otherwise enshrined in the 
Constitution.370  Such a right is also in line with Justice Kennedy’s 
declaration in Obergefell that “[w]hen new insight reveals discord between 
the Constitution’s central protections and a received legal stricture, a claim 
to liberty must be addressed.”371 
Furthermore, the public trust doctrine also secures this environmental right 
for plaintiffs.  The naturally occurring connection between navigable waters 
and the atmosphere necessarily designates the latter as a public trust resource, 
and the government in its capacity as sovereign has a responsibility as a 
trustee of public natural resources.372  The doctrine itself predates the United 
States and its institutions, and it is foundational to the social contract that 
exists between a government and its people.373  In addition, despite the 
holding of several courts that the states are responsible for upholding the 
public trust doctrine, this is based on an erroneous reading of Illinois 
Central.374  The public trust doctrine’s interpretation of state law does not 
preclude its application on a federal level.375  Indeed, delegating exclusive 
public trust responsibilities to the states undermines the doctrine’s central 
tenet of designating sovereigns—both state and federal—as trustees of 
natural resources.376 
C.  Judicial Intervention and a Normative Shift 
This Note does not argue that the judiciary should be the primary arbiter 
of federal climate change policy or carbon emissions regulations.  The 
executive and legislative branches are equipped with technical expertise and 
democratic mandates that are better suited to determining the intricacies of 
the federal government’s response to climate change.  In response to the 
global existential threat posed by a warming planet, the political branches 
can evaluate the economic, ethical, and social concerns inherent in climate 
policy better than the courts.377 
Yet, this does not excuse the judiciary’s routine practice of declining to 
review the merits of climate change cases, especially those cases that allege 
violations of fundamental rights.  Such cases fall squarely within the 
jurisdiction of courts to address government’s failures to protect citizens’ 
 
 369. See id. 
 370. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 371. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 664 (2015); see also Mia Hammersley, Note, The 
Right to a Healthy and Stable Climate:  Fundamental or Unfounded?, ARIZ. J. ENV’T L. & 
POL’Y, Fall 2016–Spring 2017, at 117, 145. 
 372. See Kelly, supra note 126, at 186–87. 
 373. See supra Part I.B.1.b. 
 374. See supra notes 301–03 and accompanying text. 
 375. See supra Part I.B.1.b. 
 376. See supra Part I.B.1.b. 
 377. See Burger et al., supra note 2, at 228. 
2021] TAKING A STAND 2771 
rights.378  Threshold justiciability doctrines and judicial restraint should not 
be so broadly applied as to deny adjudication of the merits to plaintiffs who 
demonstrate clear injuries in fact that result from government practices.379  
Though not all such plaintiffs will prevail on the merits, they deserve the full 
adjudication of their claims. 
The U.S. judiciary would also not be alone in serving as a backstop for 
protecting fundamental interests related to climate change.380  As is the case 
in Juliana, minor plaintiffs and citizen groups have filed suits against the 
governments of Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, India, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, the Philippines, Uganda, Ukraine, and the 
United Kingdom, challenging their climate policies and carbon emissions 
programs.381  In 2018 in the Netherlands, the Hague Court of Appeal in 
Urgenda Foundation v. State of the Netherlands382 found that the 
government was acting unlawfully by failing to pursue a more ambitious 
carbon emissions reduction policy.383  It rejected the government’s argument 
that separation of powers principles precluded judicial involvement, and it 
instead held that the court’s order for the further reduction of emissions 
respected the separation of powers by delegating the specifics of policy to 
the political branches.384  In 2019, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands 
upheld the court of appeal’s decision.385 
Finally, judicial engagement with core climate issues would constitute a 
significant and effective normative shift.  Judicial intervention would send a 
signal to governments and private entities about the urgency of remediating 
carbon emissions and could advance public knowledge about the topic 
through its engagement with attribution science.386  Conversely, consistent 
denial of judicial review and abdication to the political branches387—even on 
an issue the courts have acknowledged is “existential in nature”388—risks 
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encouraging judicial timidity and discomfort with the adjudication of 
fundamental rights violations related to climate change. 
CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, the judicial restraint that judges have exercised in climate 
change lawsuits is untenable in light of the ongoing nature of global warming.  
The broad application of justiciability doctrines to decline merits 
adjudication undermines the judiciary’s role of protecting citizens’ 
constitutional and fundamental rights.  Climate change plaintiffs should not 
be denied standing reflexively due to the difficulty of crafting appropriate 
remedies.  Moreover, recognizing a fundamental right to a stable climate 
system aligns with the Supreme Court’s historical due process jurisprudence 
and the public trust doctrine.  Although courts should not be the architects of 
federal climate change policy, they can and must engage in its formation by 
serving as a check on the political branches.  Judicial engagement on climate 
change issues is consistent with the traditional principles of separation of 
powers, and consistent abdication of the power of judicial review will 
become difficult to justify in the face of the impending climate catastrophe. 
